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Abstract 
Aim of the study: Notwithstanding its clinical and empirical relevance, there is no consensus on how to conceptualize 
dissociation. This may be partly due to the conflicting results yielded on the factor structure of the gold-standard self-
report measure of dissociation (the Dissociative Experiences Scale-Revised; DES-II, Carlson and Putnam, 1993). 
In an attempt to advance research on this topic, we sought to explore the factorial structure of an Italian version of 
the DES-II. Material and methods: A sample of 320 subjects (122 inmates and 198 community participants) was 
administered the Italian version of the DES-II. Results: The Italian version of the DES-II showed good psychometric 
properties and replicated a two-factor structure. Items content seemed to support the distinction into two qualitatively 
different forms of dissociative experiences, described as detachment and compartmentalization phenomena. In line 
with the expectations, participants in the inmate sample reported higher rates of dissociative experiences than 
community participants, on both dimensions. Conclusions: This study provides further support for the validity of the 
Italian version of the DES-II for use with community and inmate samples. Furthermore, we corroborated previous 
evidence on a two-factor structure of the DES-II, which is consistent with theoretical assumptions describing two 
distinct, albeit overlapping, dissociative dimensions (i.e., detachment and compartmentalization).
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Streszczenie 
Cel badania: Niezależnie od wartości klinicznej i empirycznej pojęcia, jakim jest dysocjacja, nie ma zgody co do 
właściwego sposobu jego konceptualizacji. Częściowo może to być spowodowane sprzecznymi wynikami analizy 
struktury czynnikowej złotego standardu wśród narzędzi do samooceny zjawisk dysocjacyjnych, jakim jest Skala 
Przeżyć Dysocjacyjnych (Dissociative Experiences Scale-Revised; DES-II, Carlson i Putnam, 1993). Mając na celu 
pogłębienie badań na ten temat, autorzy podjęli się analizy struktury czynnikowej włoskiej wersji skali DES-II. 
Materiał i metody: Badanie obejmowało próbę 320 osób (122 więźniów i 198 osób należących do populacji ogólnej). 
Zastosowano w nim włoską wersję skali DES-II. Wyniki: Włoska wersja skali DES-II wykazała dobre właściwości 
psychometryczne i została w niej zreplikowana struktura dwuczynnikowa. Treść pozycji na skali wydawała się 
potwierdzać istnienie podziału na dwie jakościowo inne formy przeżyć dysocjacyjnych, ujmowane jako oddzielenie 
(ang. detachment) i szufladkowanie (ang. compartmentalization). Zgodnie z oczekiwaniami więźniowie częściej 
zgłaszali występowanie przeżyć dysocjacyjnych niż osoby należące do populacji ogólnej, na obu wymiarach. Wnioski: 
Niniejsze badanie dostarcza kolejnych dowodów na zasadność stosowania włoskiej wersji skali DES-II w badaniach na 
populacji ogólnej oraz więziennej. Potwierdzono również poprzednie dane świadczące o dwuczynnikowej strukturze 
skali DES-II, co jest zgodne z założeniami teoretycznymi opisującymi dwa odrębne, choć nakładające się na siebie 
wymiary dysocjacji (tj. oddzielenie i szufladkowanie).
Słowa kluczowe: dysocjacja, populacja ogólna, więźniowie, oddzielenie, szufladkowanie
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INTRODUCTION
Dissociation encompasses those processes involv-ing a “lack of normal integration of thoughts, feel-ings, and experiences into the flow of conscious-
ness and memory” (p. 727; Bernstein and Putnam, 1986). 
Although they may occasionally occur in the daily life of 
healthy people, pathological levels of dissociative experi-
ences have been reported as characteristic or co-occurring 
across diverse psychiatric conditions (Dell and O’Neil, 
2009; Sar et al., 2007; Schäfer et al., 2010), with the stron-
gest association usually reported between dissociation and 
vulnerability to psychotic symptoms (Barker-Collo, 2001; 
Simões et al., 2014). Recent evidence also supported the 
presence of dissociation in individuals who display violent 
behaviour (Moskowitz, 2004; Ruiz et al., 2008).
Notwithstanding the clinical relevance of dissociation 
(Holmes et al., 2005; Liotti, 2006), there is a need for 
a clearer conceptualization of the dissociation construct 
(Dell and O’Neil, 2009). According to the DSM-5 (Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association, 2013), dissociative disorders 
(DD) are defined into three broad categories, namely: dis-
sociative identity disorder, dissociative amnesia, and de-
personalization/derealization disorder. In the DES liter-
ature, dissociation has historically been described with 
a three-factor model, respectively encompassing absorp-
tion, depersonalization/derealization, and amnesia expe-
riences (e.g., Carlson and Putnam, 1993). Notably, in this 
framework identity alteration would not be distinguished 
from other experiences. Another conceptualization which 
is worth mentioning has been derived from clinical descrip-
tion of dissociation (Allen, 2001; Cardeña, 1994) that sub-
sequently yielded convergent empirical findings (Brown, 
2002; Holmes et al., 2005). According to this model (Al-
len, 2001), two distinct qualitative forms of dissociation 
were described, namely: detachment and compartmental-
ization. Detachment has been depicted as the most perva-
sive form of dissociative disturbance, which encompasses 
depersonalization, derealization, and similar phenome-
na such as out-of-body experiences. On the other hand, 
compartmentalization incorporated the more dramat-
ic and perplexing of dissociative phenomena: amnesia, 
fugues, and episodes of dissociative identity disorder (Al-
len, 2001; Holmes et al., 2005). Finally, another way to 
conceptualize dissociation is to distinguish between patho-
logical and non-pathological dissociative experiences (e.g., 
Waller et al., 1996; Watson, 2003). As a result, some au-
thors recently argued that to date there is no agreement on 
how to conceptualize dissociation (Dell and O’Neil, 2009). 
Notably, factor analytic studies with mainstream measures 
of dissociation could help in reaching a clearer picture.
If the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Disso-
ciative Disorders (SCID-D; Steinberg, 1993) is regard-
ed as the best diagnostic assessment tool for DD, the 
Dissociative Experience Scale (DES; Bernstein and Put-
nam, 1986) is considered the gold-standard instrument to 
quantify the frequency of self-reported dissociative experi-
ences (van IJzendoorn and Schuengel, 1996). It has been 
translated into more than 20 languages and it has mostly 
been used in its revised version (DES-II; Carlson and Put-
nam, 1993). The DES can be used as a screening instrument 
for DD and for determining the contribution of dissociation 
to other psychiatric syndromes as well as with nonclinical 
samples (Carlson and Putnam, 1993; Espírito Santo and 
Abreu, 2009; van IJzendoorn and Schuengel, 1996).
Unfortunately, studies exploring the factor structure of the 
DES-II have to date been unsupportive in deciding among 
different conceptual models, yielding conflicting results. 
The original three-factor model proposed by Carlson and 
Putnam (1993) was confirmed across several studies (Carl-
son et al., 1993; Fabbri Bombi et al., 1996; Ross et al., 1991; 
Ruiz et al., 2008; Stockdale et al., 2002). Nevertheless, 
other authors found different factorial patterns for the 
DES, ranging from one- (Bernstein et al., 2001; Lip-
sanen et al., 2003; Mazzotti and Cirrincione, 2001) to sev-
en-factor models (Ray et al., 1992). Moreover, Amdur and 
Liberzon’s (1996), and Espírito Santo and Abreu’s (2009) 
findings supported a factorial structure composed by four 
factors.
Also, a two-factor structure first emerged in the study 
by Waller et al. (1996), who adopted a typological mod-
el of dissociation. However, Waller et al. (1996) referred to 
these factors as respectively resembling pathological (Fac-
tor 1) and non-pathological (Factor 2) dissociation. No-
tably, a categorical distinction between pathological and 
non-pathological dissociation has failed to prove its utility 
(Leavitt, 1999) and the dimensional conceptualization of 
dissociation as a continuum ranging from normal to path-
ological forms is preferred both in clinical and research set-
tings (Bernstein and Putnam, 1986; Bernstein et al., 2001; 
Carlson et al., 1993; Holmes et al., 2005; Ruiz et al., 2008).
Recently, a French version of the DES (Larøi et al., 2013) 
replicated the two-factor structure, although proposing 
a different interpretation. Indeed, Larøi et al. (2013) de-
scribed two forms of dissociative experiences. The first one 
included both dissociative amnesia episodes and deper-
sonalization/derealization experiences and was described 
as resembling dissociation episodes, which may act as 
a defensive mechanism. The second factor was depicted 
as encompassing dissociative episodes associated with dif-
ferent forms of “cognitive failures,” often concerning mem-
ory or attention. They referred to this type as automat-
ic pilot-related dissociation episodes. Notwithstanding the 
possible clinical relevance of such an explanation, to the 
best of our knowledge this interpretation of the two factors 
does not seem consistent with any other empirical evidence 
(Brown, 2002), nor with mainstream clinical theories (Dell 
and O’Neil, 2009; Holmes et al., 2005). Such inconsisten-
cy in the factor structure of the DES fosters at least one 
risk, which is the use of the original subscales reported by 
Carlson and Putnam (1993) without testing the factorial 
structure and the item loadings of the DES with the target 
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sample, which in turn can lead to wrong-headed theoreti-
cal inferences on the dissociation construct.
In the present study, we sought to explore the factorial 
structure of an Italian version of the DES-II, using a com-
bined sample of inmates and community-dwelling partic-
ipants. It is noteworthy that to date there have been no 
studies that have investigated the psychometric properties 
and the factorial structure of the DES in Italian samples, 
let alone used it with Italian offender samples, even though 
the Italian translation has been available and widely used 
for almost 20 years (Barbasio and Granieri, 2013; Conti, 
2000; Fabbri Bombi et al., 1996).
MATERIAL AND METHODS
Participants
The sample was composed of 320 subjects: 122 inmates 
and 198 community participants. Inmates had an average 
age of 39.97 years (SD = 11.76) and community partic-
ipants had an average age of 32.51 years (SD = 10.30); 
98% of inmates and 58.6% of individuals from the com-
munity were males. All participants were Caucasian, and 
all inmates were convicted of violent offenses (i.e., armed 
robbery, assault, sexual offenses or abuse, murder or at-
tempted murder). Exclusion criteria for both groups were 
the presence of cognitive disability or a diagnosed psychi-
atric disorder.
Procedures
Participants in the community sample were enrolled us-
ing the snowball sampling technique. The inmate sam-
ple was recruited from different jails and prisons located 
in or around Rome, as part of a larger study on inmates’ 
psychopathology. Participants completed the measures 
anonymously, individually or in small-group sessions set-
tled in the prison library in the presence of a licensed psy-
chologist. Participants from both groups provided writ-
ten informed consent to voluntarily take part in the study. 
The Italian Ministry of Justice and the Sapienza Univer-
sity of Rome Research Ethics Board approved the whole 
procedure, which conformed to the principles included in 
the Declaration of Helsinki.
Measure
The Dissociative Experiences Scale-II (DES-II; Carlson 
and Putnam, 1993) consists of 28 statements describing 
various dissociative experiences, some common (e.g., miss-
ing part of a conversation) and others much more unusu-
al (e.g., standing in front of a mirror without recognizing). 
Participants had to rate the percentage of occurrence of 
dissociative experiences using a scale from 0% to 100% (by 
10s, resulting in an 11-point scale ranging from 0 to 100, 
with 0% meaning never and 100% meaning at least once 
per week). The DES-II total score is then computed aver-
aging the score on each of the 28 items. Participants were 
instructed to rate the extent to which they experienced dis-
sociative symptoms, if any, without being under the effects 
of alcohol or drugs. The DES-II showed high reliability in 
its original version (test-retest = .79 < r < .84; split-half = 
.83 < r < .93; Cronbach’s α = .95; Carlson and Putnam, 
1993) as well as in its Italian translation (Cronbach’s α 
= .91; split-half: r = .92; Fabbri Bombi et al., 1996). In the 
present study, we used the Italian translation reported by 
Conti (2000), which in our study showed an excellent in-
ternal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .96).
Statistical analyses
We chose natural logarithmic transformations as the best 
technique to reduce the skewness in our raw data (Rob-
erts, 2008). A first way to determine the number of fac-
tors to retain was a parallel analysis (Watkins, 2000) us-
ing a Monte Carlo PCA, because it is a way of calculating 
the average eigenvalues for 100 sets of random data of the 
same size as our data (28 variables × 320 participants). 
After doing that, each eigenvalue obtained in SPSS was 
compared with the corresponding value from the random 
results generated by parallel analysis. Then, we performed 
an exploratory factor analysis with Maximum Likelihood 
(ML) estimator, because it allows the estimation of indi-
ces of model fit and permits the computation of model 
parameter standard errors, confidence intervals, and sig-
nificance tests. The Root Means Squared Error of Ap-
proximation (RMSEA) is particularly indicated for test-
ing model fit. According to Browne and Cudeck (1993), 
a good model should have a RMSEA value lower than .08, 
while Hu and Bentler (1999) said that it should be lower 
than .06. MacCallum et al. (1996) defined the following 
criteria: a model has a close fit if RMSEA < .05; a fair fit 
if .05 < RMSEA < .08; a mediocre fit if .08 < RMSEA 
< .10; a poor fit if RMSEA > .10. The appropriate num-
ber of factors is determined by examining the RMSEA val-
ues for the sequence of models. The sequence starts with 
a monofactorial model and a new factor is added step by 
step until a model with an RMSEA lower than .05 (ideal-
ly) is reached (Fabrigar and Wegener, 2012). The RMSEA 
difference (∆RMSEA) between two models is also impor-
tant. According to Fabrigar and Wegener (2012), any dif-
ference of .02 or greater can be considered a substantial 
difference in fit; differences between .01 and .019 can be 
considered marginal differences; differences less than .01 
can be considered not meaningful. Therefore, if adding 
a new factor, ∆RMSEA is lower than .01 (in absolute val-
ues), then the new factor can be considered not mean-
ingful and the previous model determines the appropriate 
number of factors. After calculating descriptive statis-
tics for both samples, we tested for significant differenc-
es between inmates and controls, by carrying out multi-
ple t-tests for independent samples.
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RESULTS
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
was .96 (should be ≥ .60) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
value was significant (χ2 = 4398.643, df = 378, p < .001), 
indicating that the data was adequate for factor analysis. 
According to the screeplot, an evident leveling off in corre-
spondence of the third factor emerged. Screeplots are crit-
icized because it is often difficult to see a clear drop in the 
curve. The first four eigenvalues were: 11.13; 1.15; .61; .49. 
Even if in our case the drop is clearly evident, there was 
a strong difference between the first and the second eigen-
value. Yet the second eigenvalue is smaller than the criterion 
value from parallel analysis, which showed only one compo-
nent exceeding the corresponding criterion values for a ran-
domly generated data matrix of the same size (eigenvalue 
#2 = 1.50; SD = .04). Therefore, we carried out an anal-
ysis for testing differences in RMSEA (∆RMSEA) between 
models with different number of factors. We limited our 
analyses to a model composed by one, two, or three factors.
Tab. 1 shows the goodness of fit indexes (χ2, RMSEA, 
90% C.I. of RMSEA and ∆RMSEA) of factorial models. 
# factors χ2 df p RMSEA 90% RMSEA ∆RMSEA
1 873.51 350 <.001 .0705 .0627–.0741
2 597.35 323 <.001 .0537 .0450–.0579 –.0168
3 476.72 297 <.001 .0458 .0361–.0506 –.0079
Tab. 1.  Goodness of fit indexes of factorial models tested in exploratory factor analysis with ML estimation. ∆RMSEA lower than the 
critical value of .01 is in boldface
DES-II items Factor 1 Factor 2 h2
1. Driving a car and realizing one doesn’t remember part of the trip .428 .025 .199
2. Missing part of a conversation .557 –.099 .241
3. Finding oneself in a place but unaware of how one got there .332 .455 .531
4. Finding oneself dressed in clothes one doesn’t remember putting on –.007 .752 .558
5. Finding unfamiliar things among one’s belongings .352 .417 .507
6. Being called with a different name by people one doesn’t know .447 .250 .421
7. Seeing oneself as if looking at another person .176 .626 .580
8. Not recognizing friends or family members –.164 .828 .520
9. Not remembering important events in one’s life .366 .294 .373
10. Being accused of lying when one is telling the truth .511 .137 .380
11. Not recognizing one’s reflection in a mirror .049 .709 .554
12. Other people and objects do not seem real .155 .549 .447
13. Feeling as though one’s body is not one’s own .039 .694 .522
14. Remembering past so vividly one seems to be reliving it .715 –.075 .440
15. Not sure if remembered event happened or was a dream .584 .079 .413
16. Being in a familiar place but finding it unfamiliar .505 .214 .454
17. Absorption in television program or movie .532 .061 .333
18. So involved in fantasy that it seems real .492 .204 .426
19. Able to ignore pain .384 .317 .420
20. Staring into space .712 .027 .535
21. Talking out loud to oneself when alone .392 .103 .222
22. Feeling as though one were two different people .471 .255 .457
23.Usually difficult things can be done with ease and spontaneity .700 –.095 .404
24. Not sure whether one has done something or only thought about it .743 –.120 .440
25. Finding evidence of having done things one can’t remember doing .641 .072 .481
26. Finding notes or drawings that one must have done but doesn’t remember doing .488 .150 .365
27. Hearing voices inside one’s head .038 .722 .562
28. Looking at the world through a fog .079 .641 .488
% explained var. 23.73 20.10
Cronbach’s α .936 .934
Note. DES-II: Dissociative Experiences Scale-II; h2: communalities. 
Loadings greater than .30 (in absolute value) are bolded. 
Tab. 2.  Items content and factor loadings of the DES-II obtained with oblimin rotation (ML estimation), corresponding percentages of 
variance explained by each factor and internal consistency coefficients (Cronbach’s α) for items grouped in each factor
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The analysis showed that ∆RMSEA was under the criti-
cal value of .01 (Fabrigar and Wegener, 2012) between the 
model with two and three factors. Therefore, the addition 
of a third factor is not meaningful and we can conclude 
that DES measures two latent factors.
On the basis of item content, items which were grouped in 
Factor 1 seemed to incorporate both amnesia and absorp-
tion experiences. Hence, this factor seemed to resemble 
compartmentalization, according to Allen’s (2001) model 
and Holmes et al.’s (2005) model, whereas items grouped 
into Factor 2 encompassed depersonalization and dereal-
ization (i.e., detachment). Tab. 2 shows the factor loadings 
of each item after oblimin rotation.
Items 3, 5, and 19 loaded on both factors. However, accord-
ing to their content and in order to preserve the theoretical 
coherence of the factors’ composition, items 3 and 5 seemed 
more consistent with Factor 2, whereas item 19 with Fac-
tor 1. Correlation between factors was high (r = .776). 
Tab. 3 shows the structure matrix of the factor analysis.
Tab. 4 shows the descriptive statistics (means and stan-
dard deviations) for both inmates and community partic-
ipants and the multiple t-tests for the DES-II total score 
and subscale scores. 
Significant differences emerged in all three scores. Inter-
estingly, within both samples, compartmentalization expe-
riences (Factor 1) yielded a relatively higher score than de-
tachment experiences (Factor 2).
DISCUSSION
As a whole, our results provide further support for the use 
of the Italian version of the DES-II as the gold-standard 
self-report measure to assess dissociation in nonclinical 
DES-II items Factor 1 Factor 2
1. Driving a car and realizing one doesn’t remember part of the trip .446 .329
2. Missing part of a conversation .486 .297
3. Finding oneself in a place but unaware of how one got there .655 .691
4. Finding oneself dressed in clothes one doesn’t remember putting on .528 .747
5. Finding unfamiliar things among one’s belongings .649 .668
6. Being called with a different name by people one doesn’t know .625 .568
7. Seeing oneself as if looking at another person .621 .751
8. Not recognizing friends or family members .425 .711
9. Not remembering important events in one’s life .575 .554
10. Being accused of lying when one is telling the truth .609 .501
11. Not recognizing one’s reflection in a mirror .553 .744
12. Other people and objects do not seem real .546 .660
13. Feeling as though one’s body is not one’s own .533 .722
14. Remembering past so vividly one seems to be reliving it .661 .433
15. Not sure if remembered event happened or was a dream .640 .494
16. Being in a familiar place but finding it unfamiliar .657 .573
17. Absorption in television program or movie .575 .439
18. So involved in fantasy that it seems real .637 .554
19. Able to ignore pain .609 .590
20. Staring into space .731 .534
21. Talking out loud to oneself when alone .465 .382
22. Feeling as though one were two different people .652 .590
23. Usually difficult things can be done with ease and spontaneity .632 .403
24. Not sure whether one has done something or only thought about it .658 .409
25. Finding evidence of having done things one can’t remember doing .692 .528
26. Finding notes or drawings that one must have done but doesn’t remember doing .595 .497
27. Hearing voices inside one’s head .552 .749
28. Looking at the world through a fog .534 .696
Note. DES-II: Dissociative Experiences Scale-II.
Tab. 3. Structure matrix of DES-II obtained with oblimin rotation (ML estimation)
Inmates  
(n = 122)
Community 
 (n = 198)
Variables Mean SD Mean SD t p
DES-II (F1) 22.01 16.12 14.71 14.41 4.094 <.001
DES-II (F2) 11.03 16.33 5.59 12.16 3.177 <.01
DES-II 18.08 15.61 11.45 13.10 3.917 <.001
Note. DES-II (F1): Dissociative Experiences Scale-II Compartmentalization 
score; DES-II (F2): Dissociative Experiences Scale-II Detachment score;  
DES-II: Dissociative Experiences Scale-II total score.
Tab. 4.  Means, standard deviations (SD) and multiple t-test 
comparisons for the DES-II total score and subscales 
between Italian inmates and community participants
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individuals, extending its reliability and validity to the use 
with incarcerated offenders. Regarding the factorial struc-
ture of the DES-II, our contribution joins the complicat-
ed picture reported in the literature. Although we replicat-
ed a two-factor structure, our item loadings differed from 
those reported by Waller et al. (1996)*, with both a clinical 
(DD) and a nonclinical sample, and Larøi et al. (2013) in 
a community sample. Interestingly, the factor structures re-
ported in these two studies were also different from each 
other. Furthermore, both Waller et al. (1996) and Larøi 
et al. (2013) incorporated in a common factor items re-
ferring to depersonalization and amnesia, and interpret-
ed the two factors as representing different degrees of se-
verity. This approach is inconsistent with clinical essays 
(Allen, 2001; Cardeña, 1994) which have historically con-
sidered depersonalization and amnesia as separate forms 
of dissociation. Moreover, to our knowledge, all previous 
factor analyses showed that they were always reported in 
separate factors (e.g., Holmes et al., 2005), and that items 
representing different degrees of severity were equally dis-
tributed across factors (e.g., Carlson and Putnam, 1993). 
In the current Italian version of the DES-II, all the items 
reported by Carlson and Putnam (1993) as describing de-
personalization or derealization loaded on Factor 2. Sim-
ilarly, all the items referring to amnesia and absorption 
forms of dissociative experiences loaded on a separate fac-
tor, being grouped in Factor 1**. Notably, even though the 
primary use of a measure such as the DES is to screen in-
dividuals with clinically relevant or empirically significant 
levels of dissociation, rather than attempting to character-
ize the nature of dissociation, our factorial structure seems 
partly consistent with a qualitative distinction between two 
types of dissociative experiences, being compartmentaliza-
tion (here, Factor 1), and detachment (here, Factor 2).
On the one hand, states involving a compartmentaliza-
tion involve both amnesia and other phenomena broad-
ly defined as somatoform dissociation, which are not in-
cluded within the DES-II items (Brown, 2002; Cardeña, 
1994; Holmes et al., 2005; Nijenhuis et al., 1996). Accord-
ing to this framework, the distinctive feature of compart-
mentalization is represented by an inability to intentionally 
*  It is worth noting that Waller et al. (1996) used a taxometric approach 
in an effort to develop a short measure for the screening of patholog-
ical vs. non-pathological dissociation, rather than conducting a fac-
tor analytic study per se.
**  It should be acknowledged that there are two exceptions. In fact, item 
4 and item 8 loaded on our Factor 2 (i.e., depersonalization), where-
as they are usually considered as part of the amnesia domain (Carl-
son and Putnam, 1993; Ross et al., 1991). However, item 4 had 
already been reported as part of the depersonalization construct 
(Carlson et al., 1993), suggesting that its loading may depend on the 
interpretation people give to its content (i.e., people “having the expe-
rience of finding themselves dressed in clothes that they don’t remem-
ber putting on,” which may also derive from a depersonalization epi-
sode while getting dressed). Similarly, we propose that item 8 (i.e., 
people “being told that they sometimes do not recognize friends or 
family members”) may be interpreted as a derealization experience 
(e.g., “those do not seem my real friends, or relatives”) rather than an 
actual amnesic fragmentation, especially in nonclinical individuals.
control processes or actions that people are normally able 
to deliberately control (Brown, 2002).
On the other hand, following Holmes et al.’s suggestions 
(2005), we propose that subjective experiences of an altered 
state of consciousness, accompanied by a sense of separa-
tion from some aspects of everyday experience are character-
istic of the detachment type of dissociation. Consistent with 
a dimensional conceptualization of dissociation, it has been 
argued that states of detachment lie on a continuum ranging 
from temporary experiences in the everyday life of healthy 
individuals, to persistent and/or acute conditions associated 
with a psychiatric disorder (Holmes et al., 2005). In between 
these two extremes, there would certainly be other forms of 
detachment states with associated degrees of severity and 
levels of functional impairment (Holmes et al., 2005).
The principal distinction between compartmentalization 
and detachment states is thought to be the preservation of 
apparently disrupted functions, which occurs in the context 
of compartmentalization phenomena (Holmes et al., 2005). 
Indeed, even if the affected functions (e.g., the ability to 
bring usually accessible information into conscious aware-
ness in the case of dissociative amnesia) are no longer 
amenable to intentional control, these compartmental-
ized processes keep operating normally, being in turn able 
to influence feelings, thoughts, and actions (Brown, 2002; 
Cardeña, 1994). In other words, even though they are re-
versible in principle (Cardeña, 1994) they work separate-
ly so that this compartmentalization cannot be reversed 
by a simple act of will (Holmes et al., 2005). Notably, such 
distinction has been corroborated by neurobiological ev-
idence showing different dissociative experiences belong-
ing to each component share common underlying mech-
anisms in the brain (Brown, 2002; Simeon et al., 2003). 
Moreover, the existence of a distinction between the two 
components seems to be useful in clinical settings, since 
these two forms of dissociation are relevant in the context 
of different psychopathological syndromes (Allen, 2001). 
However, less attention has been paid to the role of phe-
nomena of absorption, defined as the experience of dis-
connecting oneself from the surroundings and getting in-
volved in one’s thoughts or other imaginative processes 
(Waller et al., 1996), which loaded on the same factor as 
dissociative amnesia in the present study. According to 
our results, we suggest that states of absorption resemble 
more a mild form of compartmentalization than one of 
detachment, somehow involving a loss of volitional con-
trol (e.g., people “finding that sometimes they are listen-
ing to someone talk and they suddenly realize that they 
did not hear part or all of what was said” could be thought 
of as an inability to maintain attentional control, or sim-
ply distractibility). Moreover, another item regards people 
“having the experience of sometimes remembering a past 
event so vividly that they feel as if they were reliving that 
event,” partially resembling a sensorial alteration which is 
typical of somatoform dissociation (Nijenhuis et al., 1996), 
whose kind of experiences are not explicitly reported 
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in the DES-II, yet are thought to be part of the compart-
mentalization type of dissociation (Holmes et al., 2005). 
Supporting our view of absorption being a mild form of 
compartmentalization, Bernstein et al. (2001) noticed that 
absorption items were the more endorsed ones in nonclin-
ical subjects, compared to those regarding both deperson-
alization and amnesia, and other authors agreed in con-
sidering absorption less pathological than both amnesia 
and depersonalization (Waller et al., 1996). However, fu-
ture studies are needed given that Allen (2001) included 
absorption at the low end of the continuum in the detach-
ment domain. It should also be noted that previous works 
(e.g. Allen et al., 1999) described a second possible form 
of dissociative amnesia which was different from the one 
associated with compartmentalization, being an encoding 
problem triggered by extreme detachment.
To further corroborate the proposed distinction between 
detachment and compartmentalization phenomena, 
some authors have reported findings attesting that peo-
ple can experience detachment states unrelated to and 
without also experiencing compartmentalization epi-
sodes (Baker et al., 2003; Simeon et al., 2003), and also 
the opposite pattern has been reported (Brown et al., 2005; 
Holmes et al., 2005). Accordingly, in both samples con-
sidered here, a relatively higher degree of compartmental-
ization (as opposed to detachment) experiences emerged. 
However, the proportion of variance shared by the two fac-
tors was approximately 60%.
Notwithstanding the potentially relevant clinical impact of 
a qualitative distinction between detachment and compart-
mentalization type of dissociation, further convergent ev-
idence is needed to support a bi-dimensional conceptual-
ization of dissociation, the latter being the assumption that 
detachment and compartmentalization states are on two 
separate continuums (Allen, 2001; Holmes et al., 2005). 
For instance, further studies are warranted in an attempt 
to replicate the two-factor solution of the DES-II reported 
here, both with other Italian independent samples and in 
other countries, as well as in clinical populations. To date, 
the inconsistency in its factor structure across studies 
and samples, as well as the high degree of shared vari-
ance among the factors, lead us to support the use of the 
DES-II as measuring a uni-dimensional construct (Ber-
nstein et al., 2001; Holmes et al., 2005; Ruiz et al., 2008; 
van IJzendoorn and Schuengel, 1996). This is especially 
true for research purposes (i.e., allowing a comparison of 
results from a different sample and corresponding factor 
structure), whereas in clinical practice it could be useful 
to disentangle different dimensions of dissociative experi-
ence, yet taking into account the overall degree of severity.
As a whole, our samples’ scores were in line with norma-
tive data reported in the literature worldwide with regard to 
the presence and severity of dissociation in both commu-
nity (Carlson and Putnam, 1993; Carlson et al., 1993; Es-
pírito Santo and Abreu, 2009; Spitzer et al., 2006; Stock-
dale et al., 2002) and inmate samples (Becker-Blease and 
Freyd, 2007; Espirito-Santo and Costa, 2013; van IJzen-
doorn and Schuengel, 1996; Moskowitz et al., 2005; 
Ruiz et al., 2008; Snow et al., 1996). As expected, inmates 
reported higher rates of dissociative experiences when 
compared with community-dwelling individuals. This find-
ing suggests that dissociation may characterize the mental 
functioning of incarcerated individuals. Indeed, their rates 
of dissociative symptoms seemed comparable with those 
of patients with psychiatric disorders (e.g., van IJzendoorn 
and Schuengel, 1996). Thus, mental health services in pris-
on should include an evaluation of dissociative symptoms 
in their standard assessment for newly incarcerated indi-
viduals as well as during the period of incarceration.
Our findings should be considered in light of their limita-
tions, which also represent directions for future research. 
First, we did not assess the presence of psychotic symp-
toms in our inmate sample (although we excluded those 
diagnosed with psychiatric disorders, we cannot rule out 
the possible presence of transient psychotic episodes), 
and this could have influenced the higher degree of dis-
sociative experiences that we found in the inmate sample. 
However, the presence of inmates with psychotic symp-
toms is likely to be constant across other inmate popu-
lations (Ruiz et al., 2008). Then, we only used self-report 
measure, whereas a multi-method assessment (e.g., an ex-
pert-rated measure for assessing psychiatric symptoms, or 
an interview to investigate dissociative experiences) could 
limit the measurement bias that may affect questionnaires, 
even though both measures we used are widely accepted as 
valid and reliable instruments. Finally, we did not include 
a sample of psychiatric patients, nor a sample of patients 
with DD, thus our findings should not be generalized to 
those populations prior further explorations.
CONCLUSIONS
With these cautions in mind, this study provides further 
evidence to the reliability and validity of the DES-II as 
a measure to assess dissociation in nonclinical and in-
mate populations, representing the first Italian validation 
of the scale. Our results also highlight the alarming prev-
alence of dissociation in prisoners, calling for the inclu-
sion of a proper psychiatric assessment in prison, which 
should include an evaluation of dissociative symptoms. 
Finally, the two-factor structure of the Italian version of the 
DES-II emerged in the present study, representing the first 
empirical support deriving from self-report assessment of 
dissociation to the dichotomy between detachment and 
compartmentalization types of dissociation (Allen, 2001; 
Holmes et al., 2005). Nevertheless, further replications are 
necessary, possibly with clinical samples and with patients 
suffering from DD.
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